Why a Dialogue between Transhumanism and
Faith?
In broadest terms, transhumanism is the view
that humans should (or should be permitted to) use technology to
remake human nature (Bostrom, 2001, Walker, 2002b). It is
believed that through stem cell technology, genetic engineering
and nanotechnology the possibility exists that this century we
might be able to greatly enhance the healthy life span of
persons, increase intelligence, and some would argue, make
ourselves happier, and more virtuous (Pierce, 1996; Walker,
2003; Hughes, 2004). Central to transhumanism is the
re-contextualizing of humanity in terms of its technology; it
represents a drive towards technological exploration into the
enhancement of the human condition. In an era of increasing
innovations in informational and biotechnologies, transhumanism
presents a radical view of our future world: the merging of
humanity with technology as the next stage of our human
evolution—we have the opportunity to become something more than
human.
The idea of becoming more than human is often
discussed under the rubric of a “posthuman future”. It is
suggested that posthumans will have advanced mental, physical
and moral capabilities—beyond anything that humans presently can
obtain. Some argue that a posthuman future can be seen simply as
a logical by-product of our technology driven society; others
argue that this is to overlook the enormous ethical implications
and challenges of such an event (Walker, 2002b). Not
surprisingly, the potential technological modification of
humanity especially elicits concern from people who come from a
faith perspective or spiritual worldview. At the heart of the
transhumanist project is an interpretation (or
re-interpretation) of what it means to be human. This leads to
questions about humanity’s relationship to other entities,
including the transcendent or divine.
On first sight, the proposal to reengineer
humans may seem inimical to organized religion and persons of
faith. The propositions of transhumanism do present many points
of contention with traditional religious understandings of human
nature and the place of humans in the created order. One common
reaction here is that using technology to re-create humanity is
tantamount to humanity “playing god.” Also, some transhumanists
are quite dismissive of religion. For example, on occasion it is
claimed by some that transhumanism is a secular philosophy and
that transhumanists ought to be ever vigilant that it is not
confused with religious ideas or interpretations. These views
create a hostile polarization between religious and
transhumanist visions of humanity’s existence and future.
So, it hardly seems inappropriate to ask: “Why
a collection on transhumanism and religion? Is the point to see
the combatants enter the ring like some tawdry academic
wrestling match? Or is it an effort to broker peace?” Both
questions seem to presuppose that there is necessarily an
antagonism, and although this may be the majority view amongst
both persons of faith and transhumanists, there are voices from
both communities that suggest a more productive dialogue is
possible.
Within the past two years a conversation has
begun to emerge between members of the World Transhumanist
Association and various religious individuals and groups. In
part, this has involved transhumanists acknowledging that
religion continues to be a significant cultural force,
influencing certain public discourses, and so must be taken
seriously. It has also involved various theologians and
religious ethicists seeing the need to consider and address the
emerging technological worldview represented by transhumanism,
resulting in a recognition that there is something compelling
about the transhumanist vision of the world; touching on a
desire for a life that overcomes the brokenness of this world, a
place where pain and suffering are eliminated. This is a longing
that is articulated in many religious traditions, those that
subscribe to a distinctive eschatological belief in a future
where humanity is perfected and transformed. However, within
these areas of consonance, transhumanism also advocates some
notions about the nature of humanity and the role of technology
that can be problematic for some (or perhaps many) approaching
from a religious worldview.
Heated discussion has emerged within some
religious communities about the potential outcomes of a
transhumanist worldview. Some images and ideals of the posthuman
sit well within discussions of spiritual transformation and
other religious longings; while others, such as pursuing
transcendence through technology, stir up impassioned debate and
concerns. Discussion has also emerged about whether a
religious-based or syncretic transhumanism is possible or
desirable. This special issue of the Journal of Evolution and
Technology seeks to bring together a variety of voices in this
dialogue on issues related to technological innovation, the
human condition and secular and religious worldviews. This is
done in an effort to potentially map out a platform for further
conversation between transhumanism and faith communities.
Anatomy of a Conversation
The dialogue represented in this issue traces
its roots to 2003, when a group who were part of the Templeton
Oxford Summer Seminars in Christianity and the Sciences invited
the World Transhumanist Association (WTA) president Nick
Bostrom, to an informal conversation on the ideals and values of
transhumanism. This meeting provided a helpful interaction, as
Bostrom presented the central ideas of transhumanism and its
relationship to the idea of a posthuman existence. This
discussion also resulted in an informal working paper by this
group entitled, “A Platform for Conversation: Transhumanism and
the Christian Worldview”. This collaborative piece attempted to
define transhumanist philosophy and the posthuman vision in
order to reflect on the commonalties as well as challenges posed
to the Christian worldview. While recognizing shared values
within the Christian and Transhumanist narratives (desires for
eternal life, humanity being changed into a perfected self and
direct involvement in the creative process) it also highlighted
the inherent problems of understanding fallible humans acting as
co-creators or engineers of their own grace and perfection. This
ended with a call to selective use of technology and
encouragement that technological practice be informed by
principles of justice, care and truth.
Through these initial interactions, an online
discussion began between the two guest editors of this issue on
religious interpretations of the transhumanist project. By
exchanging papers each had written on this topic, a discussion
began to grow on how transhumanists might react to Christian
reflection on transhuman goals, and conversely the concerns
Christian theology might pose to a religious argument for
becoming posthuman. Through email and an informal meeting in
Toronto, it became evident that there was interest in seeing
this conversation develop. Wider discussions emerged on the WTA
list and within the executive that resulted in plans for a
special issue of the Journal of Evolution and Technology on
“religion and transhumanism”. The desire was to bring together a
collection of papers dealing with issues related to
technological innovation, the human condition and secular and
religious worldviews.
As well, the World Transhumanist Association
announced plans for a one day conference on the theme of
“Transhumanism, Faith and Hope” preceding the 2004 Transvision
conference in Toronto. This was to bring the conversation to a
more public forum. Alongside this event a “pre-pre-conference
event” was organized at Green College in Oxford (UK) to enable
individuals unable to attend “Transhumanism, Faith and Hope” the
opportunity to join in this emerging dialogue between religious
and transhumanists’ perspectives. The idea was that these events
would generate interest and critical thinking in this area.
The Oxford event was held in July 2004 as a
small workshop event aimed at facilitating a discussion between
WTA members, individuals interested in transhumanist values; and
Christian theologians, ethicists and philosophers. The workshop,
involving two main discussion sessions, maintained an open
candor. The first session considered “A Christian Response to
Transhumanism”, a critique of Transhumanism by a moral
theologian. Here concern expressed about the notion of
technological immortality was explored arguing that the stated
transhumanist goal of extending life span is different than the
idea of eternal life or not dying. It also raised the question
of the need for an articulated social justice for the community,
and not just the individual relations to transhumanist desires
for “morphological freedom".
Session two “Towards a Religious
Transhumanism” offered the personal reflection of a WTA member
on how his religious belief intersects with his being a
transhumanist. This was by the discussion of a paper on
theological inquiry and philosophical justification for one
possible account of a religious transhumanism. This provided
helpful insight, one participant commented, into transhumanism
as a “thought experiment, demonstrating of values and visions
informing our engagement with new technologies”. However it also
raised debate around the potential problems in reinterpreting
traditional theological understandings of what it means to be
human; and how this may or may not apply to transitional
humanity in a digital, biotechnological age. In the final
session it was agreed that the workshop brought better
understanding to the breadth of positions held by transhumanists
as well as the diversity of religious positions within
Christianity. Several areas of common interest surfaced for
transhumanists and those from a Christian religious perspective.
One was the belief that technology is a value-laden enterprise
leading to common concern for social justice, so the benefits of
technology would be available to more than merely the social and
economic elite. Another was the idea that while life extension
raises problematic issues; it is not completely contrary to a
belief in God or a higher reality. Through discussion it was
also agreed that more work needs to be done in joint exploration
of human identity, role and importance of embodiment, as well as
teasing out distinctions between therapy and enhancement and
what “spiritual” enhancement might look like.
In August 2004 the “Transhumanism, Faith and
Hope” conference was held at Trinity College, University of
Toronto. It was viewed in some respects as uneven, with new
highs and lows set in terms of dialogue between faith and
transhumanism. The nadir occurred during the latter stages of
the conference when there was an open discussion amongst all
attendees. At this point several transhumanists turned the
conversation to the question of how to manipulate persons of
faith in a manner that they might overcome their ignorance, and
so help swell the numbers of transhumanists. Whatever else is
wrong with this line of inquiry, it reveals the tendency of some
transhumanists to see persons of faith as naïve and also in need
of embracing secularism before becoming Transhumanists. This
seemed to ride roughshod over the view of many transhumanists
that transhumanism need not exclude persons of faith. But what
was painfully embarrassing for some participating in the
conference was the suggestion that persons of faith are
weak-minded. It must be pointed out too that the attitude
expressed during this part of the conference is not an isolated
incident, e.g., occasionally discussion on Transhumanists’ email
lists turn to the question of religion, and here again the
(offensive) view that persons of faith are weak-minded is often
expressed. Nevertheless, it was fortunate that most of the
“Transhumanism, Faith and Hope” conference was able to be
conducted at a much higher level than this. Several of the
presentations that day were revised for inclusion in the present
volume. Collectively the presentations that day were able to
challenge and overcome the simplistic view that transhumanism
must lie in opposition to any religious perspective; that is, to
extinguish the view that to the extent that transhumanism
succeeds in the world, it will necessarily mean the decline of
religion.
In reflection on these beginnings, and the
current journey of this dialogue, it is evident that if
transhumanism and religion are to intersect for a worthwhile and
integrated dialogue each must acknowledge this is not a
straightforward task. Each tradition brings a unique perspective to
the discussion table, and a distinctive view of the nature of
the world and humanity. However, we believe this is not a
fruitless exercise, but rather, a challenge to push forward.
Mark Walker:
When Transhumanism Engages Religion
Both religion and transhumanism offer
responses to the philosophical question: “How should we live?”
Cogitated on by philosophers and theologians from Ancient Greece to
the present, reflection on this question involves attempting to
understand the nature of humanity, our obligations to ourselves
and others, and inquiry into the question of the good life.
Among the papers in this volume you will see Transhumanist and
religious answers to this very question, and this common
interest in this important topic seems sufficient to raise hope
for a productive dialogue. On a personal note, I should say that
it is a pleasure to participate in the early stages of what I
hope will be a long and productive discourse between these
groups. And while there is much that I agree with in this
volume, my purpose here is to evaluate what I see as a certain
consensus among our contributors; namely: there is inevitably at
least some divergence between Transhumanist and religious
replies to the question of how we should live. Specifically, I
want to explore the (admittedly somewhat radical) thesis that
transhumanists and persons of faith can provide the same answer
to this question; what is more, that a case for a
transhumanism-religious hybrid can be made. That is, one can
consistently be religious and transhumanist.
To see how this might be so, let us think
first about transhumanism. Transhumanism, I believe, is best
seen as a species in the genus of Western philosophy. In this
sense it is to be understood as the latest variant on a
tradition initiated by the Ancient Greeks. It is true that
transhumanism makes much of the potential of emerging
technologies to transform our world and ourselves, but it asks
us to reflect critically on this potential. Such critical
reflection I take to be the hallmark of philosophy. So,
transhumanism—or at least those more noble aspects of
transhumanism—do not jettison the demand for philosophical
clarification and insight. Transhumanists, for example, call our
attention to potentially negative consequences of emerging
technology; the possibility that advanced forms of technology
might wipeout all life on this planet is one that transhumanists
have long maintained merit our attention. It is wrong, then, to
think of transhumanists as mere apologists for any and all uses
of technology. Transhumanists are for the ethical use of
technology. Naturally, there is disagreement as to what exactly
constitutes "ethical use’, but what is not controversial is the
idea that we ought to reflect on how technology can be used in
ethical and unethical ways. Of course, this is not to say that
transhumanism is neutral on the more general question of
technology, for it is committed to the view that at least some
uses of advanced technology can contribute significantly to the
goal of living better lives by altering our biological make-up.
An obvious question here is, better by what
standard? Transhumanists offer different answers; but,
interestingly, their responses fall along pretty traditional
lines. Some argue that allowing persons to use technology to
redesign themselves is better because it respects people’s
fundamental right to decide for themselves the constitution of
their physical make-up—what has been dubbed “the right to
morphological freedom” (Sandberg, 2001). It has been argued by
others that using technology to alter humans (and non-humans) is
the best and only means to obey the Utilitarian imperative to
maximize happiness for the greatest number of beings. (Pierce,
1996). Another possibility is to understand transhumanism in
terms of a perfectionist ethic. (Walker, 2001) Perfectionism is
the philosophical view that we have a duty to develop excellence
in our lives. It says that developing our minds and bodies are
intrinsically good things to do. While we may gain a certain
amount of happiness from achieving some level of cognitive or
physical excellence—completing a university degree, or competing
in the Boston marathon—such achievements are intrinsically good.
In other words, this good is independent of all subjective
feelings of happiness such accomplishments might bring. Think
about how we react to persons who do not strive to develop their
talents, or societies that do not allow their members to seek
such achievement (e.g., Huxley’s Brave New World is the classic
example here), and you can see the intuitive appeal of
perfectionism. For even if people are perfectly happy with lives
of little or no achievement—as is the case with the denizens of
the Brave New World—we might still be inclined to think that
something important is missing from their lives.
Perfectionism has had a long and illustrious
career in Western thought, with such luminaries as Plato,
Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche,
among its members (Hurka, 1993). One connection with
transhumanism is this: transhumanists think there is no
principled difference between
moral improvement through nurture and attempting to alter our nature to
achieve the same ends that we strive for in our nurture. Thus,
if we spend years training to achieve a certain level of
physical health and athletic proficiency, and we could achieve
this same level or more through the application of technology to
enhance our biological nature, then transhumanists say we
should. Similarly, if we spend years or decades in schools
seeking to nurture ourselves to be wiser and more knowledgeable,
and altering our biology could also be used to this end, then
transhumanists say we should (Walker, 2001).
In what direction and how far should we pursue
excellence? A very traditional perfectionist’s answer is that we
should seek to become as godlike as possible. Plato, Aristotle
and Hegel all enjoined us to become godlike, and indeed, argued
that in our wisdom at least, we could become godlike. So their
answer to the question, “How should we live?” is
straightforward: we should become as godlike as possible.
Admittedly, to contemporary ears, the idea
that we should strive to become godlike may seem quite
astonishing—to put it mildly. This position is based in part on
the idea that an essential and distinctive feature of humanity
is our capacity for reason and wisdom, and that it is through
the pursuit of wisdom that we can and should become like the
divine. Thus, Plato’s epistemological optimism is evident in his
belief that comprehension of the “true nature of everything as a
whole” (Plato, 1961b: 174) is within the grasp of those with a
philosophical inclination. Plato writes that a life spent
obtaining philosophical wisdom is to exercise the “divine power”
within us. To become divine will allow us to become “truly
perfect” and “singularly happy” (Plato, 1961a: 249c-d).
Aristotle expressed a similar view when he said that “we should
try to become [divine] as far as that is possible and do our
utmost to live in accordance with what is highest in us”
(Aristotle, 1962: 1177b). More than two thousand years later,
Hegel announced the same conviction that the exercise of reason
allows us to raise ourselves to the godlike or what Hegel refers
to as the “absolute” (1895: 65).
Transhumanists on the whole are more sanguine
about the view that human reason is godlike; nevertheless, using
technology to alter the biological basis of our reason opens up
the possibility of at least achieving a higher and more godlike
reason or intellect. This tells us why some transhumanists
should be very interested in at least some religious thinking,
for if the goal is to achieve what we can in the way of
perfection, and God is thought to be a perfect being, then
religious thought on the question of why God is said to be a
perfect being is very relevant. For unlike those who believe in
the inviolability of our biological natures, transhumanists will
seek to alter our natures in accordance with the highest states
of excellence, that is, not accepting the limits of our
biological natures.
To hear that transhumanism may be in lockstep
with the philosophical tradition of perfectionism that took root
in Ancient Greece may be unexpected, but it is perhaps no
surprise that transhumanism invites godlike aspirations, and so,
this may seem to put it ineluctably at loggerheads with
religion. Such a conclusion, I believe, should be resisted. To
do so we must first resist the temptation to think of religious
voices providing a monolithic answer to the question of how we
should live.
Consider that many persons of faith believe
that we are children of God. The importance of this idea is hard
to overestimate given that it is a common root from which
springs much religious thinking. Appealing to this idea, for
instance, makes for a very intuitive explanation of our love,
respect and closeness to God. However, to say that we are “God’s
children” seems open to multiple developments, and so it is
extraordinary that this notion has not received more critical
scrutiny. One way to understand it is in terms of the same
parent/child relation we are familiar with between adult humans
and human children: we are God’s children in exactly the same
way that we are the parents of our children. To think about it
in such literal terms is quite startling. For then it seems that
we might one day grow up and become like our Father, just as we
expect that our children will become like us in time. In other
words, taken literally, this idea implies that upon maturity we
too should be gods. Pursuing this line of inquiry quickly puts
the question of transhumanism at the fore, since, as we have
said, transhumanism offers the possibility of improving our
intellectual and moral natures. If we are to grow up and become
like our Father then why shouldn’t we side with the
transhumanist means of achieving this end, i.e., using
technology to make ourselves more godlike?
This seems to me to be a perfectly consistent
transhumanism-religious hybrid: it draws from transhumanism the
idea that we can use technology to improve ourselves, from
religion it draws the idea that part of our maturation process
to becoming like our Father is to take responsibility for our
own development. The parallel with developing human children is
quite obvious: one aspect of successfully raising children to
adulthood means helping them to eventually take responsibility
for their own development. Obviously people do not cease to
develop upon reaching adulthood. As young adults, our children
make many decisions about their future development: their
education, their career, the person they might want to have as a
partner in creating their own family, and so on. Analogously, a
Transhumanist theology sees us as entering a stage of young
adulthood, one where we take responsibility for our further
development towards becoming like our Father.
I have attempted to make a philosophical case
for this hybrid. Still, there is the question of its theological
credentials. Exactly which of the world’s religions could
accommodate this transhumanistic theology is an interesting
question—certainly one beyond my expertise. Yet, I think a case
can be made that such a hybrid does not constitute a complete
break with the history of religious thinking. One area that this
idea might be explored is in the idea of humanity as
“co-creators” with God of our world and our lives. Several of
the contributors to this volume explore the co-creator concept.
Admittedly, they return a negative verdict on the question of
whether this idea will fully support transhumanistic ambitions.
This rejection seems based in part on a conception of
theological premises that may themselves be object for further
consideration, e.g., Daly in this volume claims that his
critique of transhumanism is rooted in “orthodox Christian
theology”. Exactly what this entails is an interesting question,
although our authors tend to look to modern and contemporary
thinkers. My own work in this area looks for insight and
inspiration to the second century Christian thinker St. Irenaeus.
The Irenaean tradition in Christian theology understands humans
maturing in terms of self-development. I have argued that it is
possible to understand this Irenaean process of self-development
in terms of becoming godlike (Walker, 2002c).
A perhaps somewhat surprising further
possibility for theological accommodation of this hybrid may be
found in the writings of Pope John Paul II. In an recent article
on the late Pope’s thought David Hart, an Eastern Orthodox
theologian, writes that “there is, as it happens, nothing
inherently wicked in the desire to become a god, at least not
from the perspective of Christian tradition; and I would even
say that if there is one element of the transhumanist creed that
is not wholly contemptible—one isolated moment of innocence,
however fleeting and imperfect—it is the earnestness with which
it gives expression to this perfectly natural longing” (Hart,
2005). Hart describes this longing thus:
Theologically speaking, the proper destiny
of human beings is to be “glorified”—or “divinized”—in
Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit, to become “partakers
of the divine nature” (II Peter 1:4), to be called “gods”
(Psalm 82:6; John 10:34-36). This is the venerable doctrine
of “theosis” or “deification,” the teaching that—to employ a
lapidary formula of great antiquity—“God became man that man
might become god”: that is to say, in assuming human nature
in the incarnation, Christ opened the path to union with the
divine nature for all persons (Hart, 2005).
As Hart notes, this understanding of salvation
has not had much prominence in contemporary Western theology,
but it was well-known to the Church Fathers right through to the
high Middle Ages. Such is not the case in the East: “in the East
it has always enjoyed a somewhat greater prominence; and it
stands at the very center of John Paul’s theology of the body”
(2005). Hart’s thesis about a connection between transhumanism and the late Pope’s theology is interesting, but cannot be
explored here. It is suggestive, however, that there may be
resources within the Christian tradition to accommodate a
religious-transhumanism hybrid.
It perhaps goes without saying that this is
not the place to decide these philosophical and theological
topics. My limited ambition here is simply to indicate the
possibility that there may exist some very deep philosophical
agreement between at least some transhumanists and persons of
faith, most notably in a transhumanism-religious hybrid. Thus,
to think the opposition here is between a secular and religious
orientation is a mistake. Atheists can and do disagree about
transhumanism, and as I have suggested, persons of faith may
agree with transhumanism. I believe that a more profitable way
to express the difference here is in terms of answers to the
question: “How should we live?
Heidi Campbell:
When Religion Engages Transhumanism
When transhumanists and people of faith come
to the table, there is the potential to easily fall into a
heated debate where "technological utopians’ confront "bio-conservatives’ and lines are drawn focusing on the
inconsistency and incongruency between worldviews. A more
interesting approach, however, is to consider the challenges
that the transhumanism approach to humanity poses to religion
and worldviews that hold to a belief in a transcendent reality
directed by something greater than humanity. Through wrestling
with this challenge and tensions one can begin to identify the
commonalties that may provide potential areas for fruitful
discourse. Unpacking transhumanists' values and their
ideological tools, in the end cause people of faith to
re-examine their own views of humanity and the theological roots
of these beliefs. Exploring the complexities of religious
perspectives provides transhumanists with a fuller view of the
variety of religious belief that exists. It also calls them to
reflect and articulate in more detail their understanding about
the roots and direction of the human state.
One clear challenge raised by the
transhumanist worldview is the place of humanity in the
advocated technological order. Transhumanism articulates the
rejection of species-ism or “bioism”. In other words, humans do
not hold a primary or privileged place in the world. Bostrom has
argued that it is morally irrelevant whether an entity that is
functional or conscious runs on silicon or biological neurons
(Bostrom, 2001a)
The transhumanist view is of “human nature as a
work-in-progress, a half-baked beginning that we can remold in
desirable ways” (Bostrom, 2001b).
Humanity’s value thus comes from its being a source of potential
to create or prepare the way for new orders of sentient beings.
The essential question raised here is what is
our understanding of the nature of humanity in a posthuman
world? Also at issue is the relationship of humanity to the
transcendent or divine other, a key belief within most religious
worldviews. There is a distinct tension for religious persons if
we merely view humanity as a link in the evolutionary chain of
consciousness. This discussion calls both perspectives to
discover and clearly articulate what is the unique and intrinsic
value of our current state. While a Jewish, Muslim or Christian
worldview would echo the temporality of the body, echoing that
“all flesh is like grass” and only the spirit eternal, it also
believes that humans possess the imprint of our creator, imago
Dei (the image of God). This unseen imprint endows our existence
with worth and beauty. Thus it is not just what we can become,
but what we are in essence that makes us who we are. Our
finitude also raises interesting questions on the role and
purpose of the body in our being fully human. How necessary is
the body for us to be complete, if we are in essence spirit? How
do we define the role of the body in relation to our frailty,
yet being made in the image of an eternal God? This requires
serious reflection on the belief and values attached to human
embodiment. A dialogue between religion and transhumanism thus
calls for the need to clarify in greater details what it means
to be uniquely human in the world now and in the future.
Transhumanism also stresses the theme of
transformation that may potentially lead to new levels and forms
of existence. The transhuman, as a transitional state, is
focused on the progression towards the posthuman and the
development of humanity in many ways through technology. At one
level it may be simply seen as therapeutic, such as use of
technology to overcome an injury or bodily limitation. Yet
transhumanism also advocates the exploration of enhancement
technology and advanced forms of being. This can include the
creation of artilects (artificial minds) or possibly mind
children (potential beings created from intelligent machines).
As humanity is pushed towards this kind of
transformation, questions are raised as to the kinds of
posthuman forms we will cultivate. It seems that the connection
between what humanity now is, and what it should be, is infused
with spiritual impulse, and a desire for other worldly being.
Humanity becomes defined as a co-creator, collaborating with an
innate process of becoming, whether that be understood as
joining in with posthuman desires or connecting with the plan of
God, to birth transformed beings. Transhumanists have
articulated this relationship between the creator and the
artilect/mind child as one of joint responsibility for the
artilect’s actions where "both are held accountable for the artilect’s actions and transgressions’ (Bostrom, 2001,
"Ethics
for Intelligent Machine: A Proposal’). However, the willingness
for humans to step aside and let other intelligent machines or
sentient beings have primary roles of governance of the world is
not an idea excluded.
This leads back again into the question of the
human, not what we are but what we could or should become. There
is much teaching in religious context that emphasizes the
development of the whole person towards a more mature spiritual
existence. Emphasis on the spiritual disciplines or prayer,
fasting and meditative reflection meant to renew the mind of the
believer have long been part of the Christian tradition. This
transformation of the self is meant to move the individual
towards a more spiritually enhanced state; however,
interpretations on transformation of the body within this
perspective are more varied.
In the transhuman vision, distinction is made
between the person and the characteristics of their personality;
these are seen as separate, and potentially some aspects may be
seen as disposable. Thus it may be acceptable to sacrifice
certain aspects of personhood (embodiment, gender, personality)
for the sake of enhancing other aspects of one’s existence
(capabilities, memory, strength, endurance). Bostrom suggests
that this transhumanist’s idea of transformation is similar to
some ideas found within Christian theology. He states:
In Christian theology, some souls will be
allowed by God to go to heaven after their time as corporal
creatures is over. Before being admitted into heaven, the souls
would undergo a purification process in which they would lose
many of their previous bodily attributes. Skeptics may doubt
that the resulting minds would be sufficiently similar to our
current minds for it to be possible for them to be the same
person. (Transhumanist Values, 2001)
He argues this
after-death-transformation-towards-transcendence is a similar
predicament that arises for a posthuman being. The soul, in
leaving the body, is no longer human, yet is said to be alive in
a new form in an alternate realm. He likens this to the
transhumanist journey towards becoming posthuman, the need and
willingness to escape the current state of the body in order to
experience transcendence.
This interpretation does have some resonance
with the Christian narrative of transformation and redemption.
Yet, it also raises problems by placing emphasis on a
resurrection or new birth that is focused on self initiated
sacrifice for personal renewal. According to Elaine Graham
(March 2002) this is a transcendence that is limited to the
material, technological world that overlooks the narrative of
self-sacrifice for the sake of the community’s renewal prevalent
in most traditional Christian discourse. Graham argues that "techno-transcendence’ assumes
"religion’ and "transcendence’
can be equated through symbolic re-interpretation. Posthuman
transcendence might be better equated with Nietzsche’s "apart,
beyond, outside, above’ pointing to new maturity in humanity but
does not include the notion of redemption (March 2002: 76). This
illustrates the tensions of such an integrated discussion
between religion and transhumanism. The shared belief in
pursuing the process of bodily/spiritual transformation also
highlights the distinct differences of interpretation of the
process, focus and final outcomes of this transformation.
Through outlining this discussion we do begin
to see several overlapping areas of interest and potential
handholds for conversation between religion and transhumanism.
Transhumanism and religion share a common longing for
transformation. Both live in the tension of the "now and not
yet’, believing in a narrative that says there is a possibility
of a better world waiting for us to experience it. This
represents an eschatological focus, not satisfied with the
present and waiting in hope for the final stage of our human
evolution. In the end both have a longing for Eden, that all
will be well. However this longing for eternity represents two
different futures, one where the posthuman directs the creative
process and another where “God” directs the outcome.
Both transhumanism and religion recognize that
humanity has a place in this world, even if this varies in
degrees as being prime mover or only a step or link to something
more. This comes from a belief and respect for "living’ things,
respect for the created order (even if it is technologically,
not "naturally’ created). There is a shared desire to create a
better world and to see the breakdown biases, dividing walls and
barriers. There are varying degrees of admiration of current
humanity, but both groups would advocate acceptance of the
other. Yet the appearance of the posthuman other, be it a cyborg
or other sentient entity, will ultimately test not only this
acceptance, but also the place of humanity in the world (Foerst,
1998).
Religious worldviews and transhumanism share a
willingness to proceed with caution into the potential of new
creations. This means both call for reflection on the creative
process and advocate an ethical framework that promotes care,
security and justice for all creatures. While the Christian
framework now is typically only applied to the created order, as
posthuman entities arise, the ability to extend this ethical
framework will need further exploration. There will be a need
for transparency in our beliefs and biases towards humanity and
posthumanity, that may color ethical or policymaking decision.
Love of, or longing for, posthuman existence should not be at
the expense of humanity. Yet what it means to be human in a
posthuman world will need constant evaluation. These are just
some of the themes explored in the essays represented by this
collection.
Conversations in this Issue
In this issue Brooke argues that there is
congruence between transhumanist thinking about perfectibility
and Christian ideas of perfectibility. Brooke explores a
tradition in Christian thinking, which sees humans as
co-creators with God in creating perfection. Brooke’s examples
are mostly drawn from the Enlightenment onwards. His argument is
that embedded in the Christian tradition is a discourse that
details a vision of potential of human perfectibility. This is
an idea which is woven across time through different
interpretations of spiritual progression and bodily evolution,
which he argues, has resonance with some secular interpretation
of the potential of human perfectibility. Brooke contends that
this “helps us to understand the depth of the controversies when
they occur, because in this, as in so many disputes, the
greatest tensions can exist between positions that are very
close rather than very distant.”
Hopkins in this volume sees a concordance
between transhumanism and religion in terms of a longing for
transcendence, to overcome our mere “animal” nature. As he sees
it, “the greatest incompatibility for transhumanism and religion
will lie in choosing the method of transcendence.” He suggests
that if religious believers deny transhumanism because of its
focus on technology and physicalism they may be prevented from
“approaching genuine transcendence” This is an interesting
opposition, which is perhaps in need of further exploration.
This view is that our physical embodiment may require
improvement in order to achieve greater spiritual perfection.
Certainly the question of why God chose to make humans as
embodied creatures is one that is open to multiple answers by
religious believers.
Garner is concerned with social discourse and
investigating what religion and transhumanism have to offer
society in terms of narratives of hope and justice for the
future. He strongly addresses the techno-optimistic tendencies
he sees within transhumanism, yet calls for the Christian
community to consider more seriously the role technology has to
play in the alleviation of suffering and improvement of the
quality of life. While detailing a tight Christian theological
framework of reflection be entertained for contextualizing
technological use, Garner states “engagement with the
transhumanist technologies is demanded by this social vision”.
He also stresses that “democratic transhumanism”, which
addresses human dignity and personhood, offers a more complete
perspective to the technological project of enhancement and the
place where Christian social concern might find more consonance
in dialogue.
LaTorra takes a very pragmatic approach to the
tension: religion is not likely to disappear in the foreseeable
future so transhumanists should not engage in this battle.
Instead, LaTorra invites us to think about the possibility of
neuropsychological correlates to religious experiences. Persons
of faith may want to see if such experiences can be enhanced by
technology. Even atheists might find some value in this project,
since even if one does not believe that the experiences are
veridical, nevertheless they may be valuable.
Daly too sees “consonance” between religious
persons and transhumanists who seek to radically extend human
life through the application of technologies to ward off
deterioration of our bodies. Daly finds both scriptural and
historical evidence that Christians have often considered death
to be an “enemy”, as do many transhumanists. Of course some care
has to be given to the distinction between “bodily life” here on
earth and the life that our immortal soul may enjoy. Secular
transhumanists are of course most interested in the former sense
of radically extending human life. As Daly points out, a number
of Christian thinkers, from Descartes and Bacon to the present,
have thought that an extended bodily life might be a good thing
as well, and he details how they attempt to reconcile this with
the Christian view that God intends our lives to be finite. He
also explores several potential points of divergence between
Christians and transhumanists on this matter, namely the belief
that “life was a gift on loan from God; a proper expression of
appreciation involved the acceptance of one’s bodily limits”. He
warns that in not seeing life this way one is in danger of
making life an “ethical lord”. This idea may be open to several
understandings; but certainly it seems a mistake to think that
life is the only end, or perhaps even that it is an end in
itself. If this is what Daly means then it seems that
transhumanists owe some account of the question: what is life
for? If we think of life as having instrumental value then it
seems that we can imagine that there might be some reason for
believing that more life is good. If a longer life allows us to
effect more good deeds then perhaps this is how we may attempt
to repay in some small measure God’s gift of life. In any event,
his discussion raises many interesting questions about the
ultimate purpose of a longer life, and where this might lead in
relation to the implication of humans as transformation actors
or even co-redeemers.
Krueger offers an interesting position through
engaging recent interpretations by European media philosophers
on transhumanism. He focuses on issues related to life extension
and what he describes in some work as a Gnostic interpretation
of the body that is a disdain for the material world. He is
concerned about the problematic separation of the mind and body
in some writings on posthumanism. He argues that posthuman
discourse should not be seen as Gnostic, but read as worldview
concerned with overcoming the "concrete body". By employing the
idea of "cyberspace" he argues that transhumanism has a tendency
toward "cybergnosis". This is not to disregard the body, but the
re-contextualising of it in terms of virtual or higher reality
that allows it to overcome physical space to find a new
existence.
Bainbridge foresees a clash between
transhumanism and faith, offering both a sociological and
philosophical reason for this position. His sociological reason
is that transhumanism and the potential for technology to
ameliorate suffering and generally improve our world, threatens
the church’s monopoly on power. Accordingly, he says, “one might
predict that all but the most secularized forms of religion will
brand it sacrilegious.” It is true that for many, God is our
spiritual leader, but it is less clear how this supports
Bainbridge’s sociological prediction. The reason is that
religious leaders have no absolute dominion over their
followers. This is not to say that Bainbridge is wrong in
predicting that many religious leaders will brand transhumanism
as sacrilegious, but the question is how much hegemony they will
maintain in this viewpoint. The philosophical reason Bainbridge
cites is that transhumanism’s suggestion that we might be able
to improve upon human nature is an implicit critique of God’s
handiwork. Certainly some may see it this way. The question is
whether persons of faith must see it this way, an issue raised
in other articles.
Together this collection offers a varied look
into the variety of response that has been given by secular and
religious perspectives to technological advancement. It also
offers innovative critiques to the question of how religious
discourse has or can respond to transhumanist values. The
strength of the transhumanist perspective, illustrated in this
issue of JET, is its forward looking approach and response to
human evolution, an area which religious discourse often
overlooks as people of faith are often not good futurists. Yet
as religion tends to be more narrative and historically focused
in its investigations and inquiry of human development it
provides an important historical contextualization, one that
often is not well developed within transhumanists’ exploration
of personhood or humanity. Therefore, it is hoped that through
the conversations of the papers in this issue that religion and
transhumanism can learn from one another, and move towards a
place of greater understanding of the worldviews they represent.
Although this volume was intended to explore
the relations between religion and transhumanism, the reader
will find that Christianity is discussed almost exclusively
(although one of the authors, Mike LaTorra, is an ordained
Buddhist priest). This does not reflect an editorial decision by
the guest editors, but rather, is an artifact of the pool of
papers submitted for this volume. It is the sincere hope of the
guest editors that the conversation between religion and
transhumanism in the future will expand to include voices from
all religious traditions.
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