The last few years have
seen scientific advancements that were thought to be possible only in the realm
of science fiction. From nuclear
transfer to exogenous pregnancies, implantable brain chips to transgenic
engineering, cyborg to chimera, we may be taking the next step in our own
evolution. As barriers between the species begin to blur and blend, should
humans retain special elevated status? How will these affect notions of
“personhood”? Possible implications range from affecting the abortion debate to
end-of-life decision making to animal rights. If traditional notions of personhood
prevail, are we running the risk of denying essential basic liberties to
sentient beings? If modern expanded
notions of personhood prevail, do we run the risk of somehow being “degraded”
and losing our “human dignity”? Legal
notions of personhood have lagged far behind the philosophical and ethical
discourse, yet some courts and legislatures have seen fit to extend the
definition by creating legal fictions to recognize such entities as
corporations and ships as “persons.” The
law has been notoriously slow in keeping up with ethical issues and
technological advances; legislatures are loath to deal with controversy and
courts must often wait until litigation arises out of a crisis. The next several decades will test the
flexibility of the law in response to evolving advancements.
In this thesis, I
analyze and review the literature of classical ethical, religious and legal
definitions of personhood. I explore
which significant developments in biotechnology may affect evolving legal and
ethical notions of personhood; I also outline a rubric for considering the
definition and scope of the human identity as “person” from different research
perspectives, including legal, philosophical, ethical and technological.
Finally, I examine whether or not there is a recurrent theme, a common thread,
commensurability, some unifying underlying principle, in philosophical and
theological perspectives and in the decisions made by courts, legislatures, and
governmental agencies. In my quest for
commensurability, I argue that a balancing approach is warranted, resulting in
an expanded, evolving notion of personhood.
Les toutes dernières
années ont été le témoin de progrès scientifiques qui jusqu’alorsrelevaient du domaine de la
science fiction . Du transfert nucléaire aux grossesses exogènes, des
puces implantées dans le cerveau à
l'ingénierie transgénique, du cyborg à la chimère, nous sommes peut-être au
seuil de la prochaine étape dans notre
propre évolution. Alors que les frontières entre les espèces commencent à se confondre, l’être humain devrait-il retenir son statut spécial au sommet de la
pyramide ?Comment ces changements
affecteront-ils la notion de « personne » ? Les implications
possibles s’étendent du débat sur l’avortement à la décision de mettre fin à la
vie, aux droits des animaux. Si les
notions traditionnelles de personne
prévalent, est-ce que nous courons le risque de nier les libertés essentielles fondamentales aux êtres
sensibles? Si les nouvelles notions élargies de personne prévalent, courons-nous le risque de nous dégrader d'une
manière ou d'une autre et de perdre
notre dignité humaine ? Les définitions
juridiques de personnalité traînent loin en arrière du discours philosophique
et éthique, pourtant certains tribunaux ont jugé valable d’étendre cette définition en créant des entités juridiques
fictives pour assimiler juridiquement
des sociétés commerciales et bateaux à des “personnes”. La loi est
sérieusement en retard par rapport aux
questions d’éthique et au progrès
technologique; les corps législatifs sont réticents à aborder les sujets
controversés et les tribunaux dovent attendre jusqu'à ce qu’un litige naisse
d’une crise. Les prochaines décennies constitueront un test de la flexibilité
de la loi pour répondre au progrès scientifique.
J'analyse et passe en revue la
littérature qui traite des définitions classiques de la personne éthique,
religieuse et juridique. J'explore les développements significatifs de la biotechnologie susceptibles d’ affecter une notions de personne
éthique et juridique en constante évolution; j’ esquisse également un
cadre pour considérer la définition et l’étendue de l’identité humaine
comme “personne” , à partir de diverses perspectives de recherche , y compris
sur le plan juridique, philosophique, éthique et technologique. Finalement,
j'examine s’il existe un thème commun et
récurrent, un fil conducteur, un
principe d'unification fondamental dans les perspectives philosophique et
théologique et dans les décisions prises par les tribunaux, les corps législatifs, et
les agences gouvernementales. Dans ma quête
d’éléments communs, j’argumente
qu'une approche équilibrée est justifiée, et qu’elle résulte en une notion élargie et évolutive de la personne.
I
would like to express deep gratitude to my advisor, Kathleen Cranley Glass, for
her encouragement as well as her insightful, instructive questions, which
consistently guided and stimulated my thinking in this area. I would also like to thank Professor Walter
Glannon and Professor H. Patrick Glenn for opening new vistas of learning;
their writings and teachings have been a source of inspiration and
enlightenment. I also wish to
acknowledge that part of the title of this paper “at the Margins of Personhood,”
as well as many of the ideas presented, was inspired in part by Walter
Glannon’s article entitled “Tracing the Soul: Medical Decisions at the Margins
of Life.” I wish to thank my husband, Kim G. Glenn, for
his invaluable and unwavering intellectual, emotional and practical support and
my sister, Dr. Jeanann S. Boyce, for lending me her expertise, as well as for
her emotional and intellectual support. This paper is dedicated my faithful
canine companion of 18 years, who recently passed away and who was and always
will be a “person” to me.
Advances in biotechnology, specifically,
transgenics and artificial intelligence, have led us to a place where no one
has gone before: Chimeras,
cyborgs, artificial life forms, new species, and variations or combinations of
all of the above. As barriers between
the species begin to blur and blend, should Homo sapiens retain special
elevated status? Currently, human beings cannot be patented, but the definition
“human being” has yet to be defined by the courts or the legislature. Arguments as to what constitutes “personhood”
are being closely scrutinized and debated in the fields of religion, ethics,
psychology, and law. If traditional notions of personhood prevail, are we
running the risk of denying essential basic liberties to sentient beings? If modern expanded notions of personhood
prevail, do we run the risk of somehow being “degraded” and losing our “human
dignity?” Is there a recurrent theme, a
common thread, commensurability, some unifying underlying principle, in the
decisions made by courts, legislatures, and governmental agencies? In this paper, I explore traditional and
modern notions of personhood, and in my quest for commensurability, I argue that
an expanded legal notion of personhood will be warranted for certain new life
forms, both transgenic and artificial intelligence.
In Greek
mythology, the chimera was part lion, part goat, part dragon, which was slain
by the hero Bellerephon. In modern day biology, a chimera is a genetically
engineered creature created from the DNA of different species. What once was
fiction has now become fact; through the process known as DNA recombinant
research, scientists are able to splice genes together from different species
that would never be able to mate under normal, non-laboratory circumstances. A review of some of the last few years
announcements illustrate the amplitude of the advances:
November 6, 1997 – Boston,
Massachusetts - Genzyme
Transgenics announces that it has created transgenic mice that can produce
human prolactin, a protein which may enhance the body's immune defenses against
disease, in their milk. Other therapeutic proteins in the milk of transgenic
mice, rabbits, goats and cows, focus on treating autoimmune disorders, such
rheumatoid arthritis and lupus, and cancer.
July 22,
1999 – London, England – A British
biopharmaceutical company announces that for the first time they have
successfully inserted human genes into a pair of lambs, Cupid and Diana, who
entered the world implanted with a human gene that gives them the ability to
produce human serum albumin, a protein that is essential to the treatment of
burn victims and is often used in surgeries.
August 16, 2000 – Blacksburg, Virginia – William Drohan, senior
director of plasma development at the American Red Cross, announces that the
work of Virginia Tech dairy scientist R. Michael Akers "holds tremendous
promise for the large-scale production of life-saving human therapeutic drugs
in quantities far greater than could ever be produced through fractionation of
human blood.”
January 4, 2002 – undisclosed location in Missouri
- Scientists at the University
of Missouri announce a
possible breakthrough in xenotransplantation; they have created genetically
engineered pigs whose organs lack a gene that triggers rejection by the human
immune system.
For all the hype about potential
benefits, the potential abuses are equally frightening. The International
Olympic Committee has concerns that athletes will soon employ genetic
engineering to run faster, jump higher, and throw further. Lawyer George Annas suggests that we need to
set up an international criminal tribunal that will ban genetic engineering and
xenotransplantation, as well as other forms of possible alterations of humans
for fear of endangering the species or creation of a slave race. The headlines and fears of potential abuses
raise the question of just how many genes does one need to be considered
“human,” a question that is discussed in a later section of this paper.
In April 1998, biologist Stuart Newman and
biotech critic Jeremy Rifkin applied for a patent for a “humanzee,” part human
and part chimpanzee, in a calculated move designed to re-ignite debate about
the morality of patenting life forms and engineering human beings. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(hereinafter, PTO) denied the patent, acknowledging
that, although it has permitted the extensive patenting of biotech-engineered
life forms and human DNA, 13th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
forbids the ownership, and they considered this application to be too close to
the patenting of human beings. Since the
United States Supreme Court, Congress or Patent Office have never defined what
a human being is, the debate still continues about whether or not the
PTO as an executive arm of the United States government has the power to define
“human being.”
Transgenics and genetic
engineering are not the only ways that humans have started to re-create or
redefine themselves; the Bush administration’s limitations on use of federal
funding for new embryonic stem cell line research has re-ignited the debate
about whether or not an undifferentiated embryo is a “person.”
Other efforts to change the boundaries
include a White House proposal to provide Medicaid health coverage for fetuses
and the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, a bill making it a federal crime to
harm a fetus during an attack on a woman (terming a fetus a “person” from the
moment of conception, skipping right over the embryo stage). While this is a debate that is not going to
be resolved directly, there are technological developments that will likely
change the focus of the debate. These
developments include 1) advancing techniques of the neo-natal intensive care
unit, where the threshold of extra-uterine viability has been possibly pushed
back to 20 weeks (or five months) gestation,
2) the theoretical possibility of male pregnancy,
and perhaps most importantly, 3) the artificial womb. While these developments may not directly
answer the debate of the moral status of the fetus or embryo, they will remove
the maternal-fetal conflict inherent in the present discussions and disentangle
the issue from the rights of a woman over her own body.
In an effort to
bypass the moral dilemma presented by the use of human embryos, scientists have
sought alternate ways to rebuild the body. As of this time, there appears to be
only two ways to replace injured or diseased body parts: either “re-growing”
them (as with stem cells); or mechanically (as in extensions or
prosthetics). Some possible alternatives
to the controversial embryonic stem cells include:
·
Adult stems cells –Rare, hard to isolate and
purify, hard to grow in culture, these may not exist for all tissues.
Additionally, they are multipotent as
opposed to pluripotent, which means
that they can form only a limited number of tissues; pluripotent cells can form
an unlimited number of tissues.
·
Umbilical cord blood and placentas are rich in
multipotent and some pluripotent stem cells, but as of this time, there is no
centralized mechanism for harvesting these.
·
Skin and scalp cells may be rich in multipotent
stem cells
·
Development of drugs that activate the body's
stem cells to let the body repair itself.
·
Parthenogenesis - from the Greek word for
"virgin birth." Eggs that can be turned into embryos without being
fertilized by sperm, from which stem cells can be extracted. Such embryos
("parthenotes") could never mature, so destruction of them to make
stem cells may not raise the same moral issues as destruction of embryos.
·
Cellular reprogramming, also called de-differentiation aims at getting
specialized body cells to revert to a primordial state, like stem cells, so
they can be turned into various types of tissues.
·
Transdifferentiation aims to turn a cell back to
its primordial state in order to turn that primordial cell into another type of
cell.
What is the
significance of embryonic stem cell research and its alternatives with regard
to evolving notions of personhood? Aside
from the issue of whether or not the embryo is a person, the moral peril is not in the replacement or
transplantation of injured or disease body parts, but in the use of this
technology for enhancement, patentably, commercial profit and the creation of a
market for body parts. In
1984, a leukemia patient, John Moore, had his spleen removed in the
course of treatment; unbeknownst to him, his spleen cells had a unique quality. When his physicians realized this, they used
his cells to develop a commercially valuable cell line, without Moore’s knowledge or
consent. Moore
filed suit on the grounds of lack of informed consent and on a claim of
conversion; the California Supreme Court held that Moore did not retain any property or
ownership interest in cells after they left his body.
Taking this ruling to its extreme, what if instead of Moore’s spleen cells, it had been his brain
cells? Or a large portion of his organs?
Or an entire body transplant?
The notion of
property rights in application to one’s body presents some remarkable
paradoxes.
In the dualistic metaphysic approach, duality of mind and body, the body is
treated simply as a material object,
and the real “self” or person lies in the abstract or in the continuity of
self-consciousness or personal identity.
Lori Andrews subscribes to this approach arguing that definitions of personhood
rarely focus on the possession of body parts, but rather on sentience or
cognitive traits.
If persons are purely abstract rational agents, there is no necessary
connection between persons and property.
Under this approach, theoretically, a cell line derived from Einstein’s brain
cells
or cell lines from the cloned embryos other celebrities, could be patented
cloned and sold, without the donor having a property interest or cause of
action for theft of one’s identity, genetic, personal, or otherwise.
The Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC), in its interim report to
the Government of Canada
recognizes that there is danger of
“commodification of life” in allowing patenting of higher life forms.
On the other hand,
a popular Western point of view is that our personhood is tied to our physical
bodies;
the “embodiment” approach treats the person as a unique individual who is
inseparably unified in mind, body, and spirit.
Margaret Jane Radin points out, “Objects are closely bound up with personhood
because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal
entities in the world.”
Radin proposes a continuum approach for
dealing with the property in relation to personhood, proposing that the more
“fungible” an item, the less tied to personhood, and the more “personal” an
item is, the more it is tied to personhood. Under this approach, arguably, items such
Einstein’s brain cells or cell lines from celebrities would be inseparable from
the persons and subject to more protection under the law.
My own experience
with individuals facing end-of-life decision-making suggests that they feel
once their mind (i.e. their consciousness) is gone, so in essence is their
“self.” I have had friends, family, and other loved ones explain, “If my mind
is gone, let my body and spirit go.” Is
the brain a nexus of the mind, or perhaps, an expressive conduit? What will
happen when we can keep the mind (and brain) going through regeneration or other
methods, such as the whole body transplant? Emerging “neuro-remediation” techniques may
soon lead to psychological continuity and change the very definition of death. In November of 2001, researchers reported
reliable ways to coax human embryonic stem cells into becoming brain
cells. Reported in the Journal of Nature Biotechnology, the
researchers said they coaxed the stem cells into becoming the three types of
brain cells – astrocytes, oligodendrocytes and mature neurons.
In one experiment the researchers transplanted about half a million cells into
the brains of newborn mice and saw them integrating throughout the brain and
propagating. The results show promise
for future development of repairs to brain and nerve injuries, even for those
who may have been considered “permanently unconscious.”
Certainly, for individuals like Jeffrey Galli, a young man with a severe spinal
cord injury, who describes himself as a “brain on a stick”,
this research represents an important step towards reconnecting with an
important part of his “self,” his body.
Regardless of whether one
takes the dualistic metaphysic view or embodiment view of personhood, the
advancing technology will change the nature of the debate. The impact of stem cell research, by holding
out promise for repair of injured brain and nerve cells, as well as other body
parts, is forcing us to re-examine and re-evaluate who and what we are; so do
the advances in the integration of man and computer. Artificial limbs, retinas, cochlear implants,
and other prostheses are redefining who and what we are.
The notion of cyborgs is no
longer science fiction; the latest developments in cybernetics, the integration
of living tissue and technology, the melding of man and machine is now taking
place, as chronicled below with an overview of the latest developments in this
field. The distinction between “alive”
vs. “not alive” or “animate” vs. “inanimate” is one that is becoming
increasingly difficult to determine.
Does something have to be conscious to be alive? And what is
consciousness?
January-February
1999 -- Ellen M. McGee and Gerald Q. Maguire
present one of the first ethical analyses of implantable brain chips
and cyborgs. As intelligence or sensory "amplifiers," the implantable
chips will generate at least four benefits: l) increasing the range of senses,
enabling, for example, seeing infrared light, ultraviolet light and chemical
spectra; 2) enhancing memory; 3) enabling "cyberthink" — invisible
communication with others when making decisions; and 4) facilitating access to
information where and when it is needed.
They predict that these enhancements will produce major improvements in
quality of life or in job performance.
They also predict these devices will be in regular use by the military within
10 years, and adopted by information workers within 15 years, and available for
general use in 20 to 30 years.
April 17,
2001 – Chicago, Illinois - Physiologist Sandro Mussa-Ivaldi of Northwestern
University's Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago announces that they have
combined a mechanical device with living tissue, developing a robot that is
controlled by an immature lamprey eel brain.,.
Instead of attempting to emulate a biological nervous system, the technology
goes one step beyond, tapping into the nervous system of a live creature.
This new work opens up the long-term possibilities of learning more about how
brains work so electronic microprocessors can be developed to help human
patients compensate for damage from strokes and other types of nerve trauma.
Kevin Warwick, a cyberneticist at Reading University, believes that it may even
one day be possible to have your brain transferred to a robot when your body dies.
It would be extremely difficult, "but mapping the entire brain to a robot
can't be ruled out,” he says.
More realistic, he says, is connecting electronic devices such as mobile phones
directly into our brains.
Summer, 2001 - Linda Griffith, associate professor of
bioengineering and chemical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology of Chips, announces the merger of human cells and silicon in a
“liver chip,”
in the hopes of alleviating the suffering that is caused by lab animals and
humans in Phase I clinical trials. The
Boston Globe quoted Griffith as saying “We hope to someday build the human body
on a chip.”
and took note that in laboratories across the country, the lines between what
is alive and what is a machine are being blurred by innovations such as
toxin-tracking bacteria mounted on chips and a robotic arm directed by monkey
brain waves.
A
few months later, scientists at the Max Planck Institute for Biochemistry
announce that they have linked brain cells and silicon chips electronically
creating a part-mechanical, part-living electronic circuit.
The hope is to develop artificial retinas or prosthetic limbs that are
extensions of the human nervous system; to combine the mechanical abilities of
electronic circuits with the extraordinary complexity and intelligence of the
human brain.
November
2001 – Austin, Texas - Researchers are developing
nanocrystals, or quantum dots, that can connect with individual neurons. This
will allow for new bioelectronic devices, from brain implants, therapies and
prosthetics to neural computers.
Technology at the nanoscale (i.e. at or around a billionth of a meter - about
1/80,000 of the diameter of a human hair, or 10 times the diameter of a
hydrogen atom) is providing the keys to biological
questions, such as the functioning of the immune system, and is leading to the
developments of infinitely modifiable connectivity.
This
technology is paving the way to the brain-machine interface.
MIT’s Technology Review
named the brain-machine interface as one of the technologies that will change
the world.
In a series of animal and human experiments dating back to 1990,
neuroscientists and a team of researchers affiliated with Emory
University in Atlanta created a basic but completely
functional alternative interface using electrodes surgically implanted in the
brain. In 1996, they convinced the FDA to allow two human tests. Author John Hockenberry, a paraplegic himself
in search of alternative remedy to his situation, tells the story of Johnny Ray, a 63-year-old from Carrollton, Georgia,
who suffered a
brain-stem
stroke in 1997, resulting in what is called
"locked-in syndrome,” characterized by complete paralysis of voluntary muscles in all parts of
the body (except for those that control eye movement.)
Individuals with locked-in syndrome are conscious
and have cognitive function, but are unable to speak or move. The disorder
leaves the patient completely mute and paralyzed. Communication may be possible
with blinking eye movements.
The team implanted a subcranial cortical implant,
physically melded with brain tissue.
Within the next year, Ray was able to control a computer cursor with his
thoughts, and also actually started to regain facial movements and expressions. The implant triggered the motor neurons of
his brain to activate and to create new neural pathways to parts of the brain
that were, prior to the stroke, underutilized or unused.
Similar results have been achieved in more than one study.
And so the
question arises again: How much living tissue is needed to make such a cyborg
“alive” or “conscious?” And does it make a difference if animal tissue or human
tissue is used? And if you modify, alter or enhance the brain, when does it
become a different entity? If animal tissue is used, it could conceivably lead
to cybernetic organism that may be equally intelligent to, or even possess
superior intelligence than the average human.
Such a creation might be incredibly rational and even articulate, but
without emotion. Is the ability to feel
pain and pleasure an essential part of being alive and a “person?” Would an
intelligent, sentient creation be property or a person? Could he/she/it be
patented? Patents on animal and other
life forms are allowed in the United States
and likely soon in Canada. European and Asian patent legislation
includes prohibitions on inventions whose commercialization would “offend
society’s fundamental and shared moral standards,”
and could arguably exclude certain higher life forms.
The next challenge
of defining personhood will be exploring notions of “cyberhood”
or alternatively, “cyborghood.” If the Moore case, cited supra, is taken to its furthest reach, the current judicial
approach suggests that it would make no difference if animal or human tissue is
used. The Moore ruling ushers in other problematic questions: Does it matter how much tissue is used? Could
a portion of an individual’s brain could be used to create an intelligent
part-live, part-machine cyborg and that individual or his estate be left with no
property interest or claim in the matter?
What
is Artificial Intelligence? Before
defining artificial intelligence, it
might be prudent to first define what is meant by intelligence. Stan Franklin, the author of Artificial Minds, admitted that he and a group of colleagues
attempted to tackle the definition of intelligence, and after two years of
wrangling, gave up.
Webster’s Dictionary defines it as “1 a (1) : the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying
situations: reason ; also : the skilled use of reason (2) : the ability to apply knowledge to
manipulate one's environment or to think abstractly as measured by objective
criteria (as tests).”
Webster’s also defines artificial intelligence as “the capability of a machine
to imitate intelligent human behavior.” The American Association of Artificial
Intelligence (hereinafter AAAI) defines it as the
simulation of human intelligence processes by machines, especially computer
systems. These processes include learning (the acquisition of information and
rules for using the information), reasoning (using the rules to reach
approximate or definite conclusions), and self-correction.
Stan Franklin
defines artificial life “as the study of man-made systems that behave in ways
characteristic of natural living systems.”
But can it be
argued that artificial intelligence can be self-aware and, therefore, have rights?
Ray Kurzweil, author of The Age of
Spiritual Machines (1999), argues there is no sharp distinction between
human and machine intelligence; that by becoming increasingly “cyborgized” by
the use of permanent and removable implants that we are swiftly removing any
meaningful difference between man and machine. He speculates that eventually we will be able to achieve immortality by “downloading” our minds into secure spiritual machines. Kurzweil refers often to “The Singularity,”
a phrase borrowed from the astrophysics of black
holes. As used by Kurzweil, it refers to the idea that accelerating technology
will lead to superhuman machine intelligence that will soon exceed human
intelligence, probably by the year 2030.
The foundation of this idea grew from what is now known as “Moore’s
law.” In 1965 Gordon Moore, co-founder
of Intel, half jokingly predicted that computer processing power would double
every 18 months. This prediction has
turned out to be an underestimate. Roboticist Dr. Hans Moravec, author of Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind
(1998), estimates that the computing power of the human brain is about 1014
operations per second, and its storage capacity about 1014 bytes.
At the present rate of exponential growth, Kurzweil, Moravec, and others are
predicting that the machines will exceed these numbers by 2030 and, at that
time, these machines will exceed human intelligence.
Kurzweil has also estimated that by
2030 a $1,000 PC will equal one human mind, and by 2060 it will equal the
mental capacity of all humans. By 2099, assuming our population is 10
billion, one penny will buy computing power with one billion times the mental
capacity of all humans, making it accessible to every man, woman, child, and
any other life form that might want it.
But
does computing power equal intelligence? What yardstick does one use to measure
intelligence? One standard that has been widely used is called the “Turing
Test,” an adaptation of an “imitation game” suggested in 1950 by mathematician
Alan Turing. In the original version of the imitation game, an interviewer
talks to a man and woman through a teletype and has to decide which is which.
Turing suggested that a machine take the place of the man or woman and it would
be up to the interviewer to decide if he or she were communicating with man or
machine. Any machine that could successfully
deceive the interviewer into thinking he/she was talking to another human is
deemed to be intelligent. But the
drawbacks of such a test are numerous. First, such a test could conceivably
reflect the programmer’s skills, rather than the computer’s. Secondly, such a
test is inherently anthropocentric; there are conceivably measures of
intelligence that are not measured in humans, such telepathic ability.
Additionally, aside from math and language skills, some argue that there are
different types of intelligence such as emotional intelligence, musical
intelligence, and spatial intelligence. Despite creators of college entrance exams
proclaiming otherwise, intelligence is multifaceted. Author and futurist,
Jerome C. Glenn, proposes a “spherical approach” to intelligence, education,
and other values and virtues, which may be a more useful way of approaching
measures of learning.
Thomas M. Georges, author of Smarter Than Us?: Intelligent Machines and
Human Values (2001), proposes that instead of rigorously defining
intelligence, that it should be treated as a compilation of characteristics
that is best measured by degree. Those characteristics include:
1)
The
ability to store and retrieve knowledge;
2)
Learning
from experience and adapting to novel situations;
3)
Discriminating
between what is important and what is irrelevant to the situation at hand;
4)
Recognizing
patterns, similarities, and differences in complex environments;
5)
Creating
new ideas by combining old ideas in new ways;
6)
Planning
and managing strategies for solving complex problems;
7)
Setting
and pursuing goals;
8)
Recognizing
one’s own intelligence and place in the world.
Although Georges’
acknowledges that this compilation is limited because it is anthropocentric, by
recognizing that intelligence is a matter of degree, he moves away from the
black-and-white or “either-or” thinking of a being as either intelligent or
not. Georges leaves the door open for the possibility that the list will be
open-ended, but his last characteristic of “recognizing its own intelligence
and its place in the world”
highlights the limitations of a hierarchical worldview, as opposed to a
wholistic or interdependent worldview, discussed infra, later.
From intelligence, artificial or not, Moravec
sees the next step of human “techno-evolution” as opening up the possibility of
liberating mere humans from the crippling limitations of their biology. He sees these super AI machines as our
progeny, "mind children" built in our image and likeness; ourselves
in a more dynamic, almost invincible, form. He argues that like biological
children of previous generations, they will embody humanity's best hope for a
long-term future; and that behooves us to give them every advantage. He envisions a sort of Robo sapiens, a new,
post-biological, transhumanist species that will spread across the stars and
galaxies, creating a vast interstellar culture.
The Declaration of
the World Transhumanism Association, a pro-technology group, outlines a
philosophy of balanced deliberation: that the benefits of advancing
technologies must be weighed against the potential harm such technologies could
inflict on all living beings on this Earth; that short-term gains need to be
considered against long-term consequences; that open forums and debate are the
best way to implement rational decisions; and that, the well-being of sentient
creatures (whether in artificial intellects, humans, non-human animals,
possible extraterrestrial species, or some combination thereof) comes first.
Although this declaration does not make any reference to religious or spiritual
beliefs, its overall philosophy encompasses
many principles of modern secular humanism, and also some of the classic
principles of moral philosophy.
Genesis 1:26-31:
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26
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Then God said, "Let Us make man in Our
image, according to Our likeness; let them have
dominion over the fish of the sea, over the
birds of the air, and over the cattle, over all the
earth
and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth."
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The above biblical
quotation has been widely used to justify humanity’s dominance over the other
species on this planet; because we (humans) are created in God’s own image,
we are deemed to be superior and unique. Because we were given dominion over
“…every living thing,” this has been interpreted to mean that man is supreme on
this earth and should subdue the other creatures. This metaphor for a divinely inspired
universal hierarchy ranking all forms of higher and lower life has been
referred to as the Great Chain of Being.
This idea, originally introduced by Aristotle,
is a fusion of Greek philosophy and Christian theology, with “man” occupying a
unique slot in this chain, and having dominion over lower life forms. This
Great Chain of Being has been depicted with God at the very top of the Chain;
Angels, a level below; Man at the center level below Angels; Animals, a level
below Man; and Plants at the very bottom.
I use the term “man” instead of “human” because neither Aristotle nor the
Catholic Church (hereinafter “the Church”) recognized the equivalent moral
status of humans; Aristotle believed that women, children and slaves were
inferior, and that they lacked immortal souls;
and the Church’s treatment of women
and lower life forms
was less than compassionate. McGill scholar Edward Keyserlingk explains that
there is general agreement between the Protestant and Catholic analyses of the
sanctity of life principle, which are both rooted in the same Judeo-Christian
traditions. A
basic tenet of the Judeo-Christian belief system is that Man is special because
he alone is made in the image of God,
and “above all creatures, he is the object of God’s love and attention; the
other creatures…were given for man’s use.” It is from this view that only human life is
held sacred, that the focus of Judeo-Christian morality is the protection and
care of human beings, and that other creatures may be used to suit humanity’s
purposes;
and the foundation for the “sanctity of life” doctrine.
This hierarchical
view is sympathetic with the prevailing view during the Middle Ages that the
Earth was the center of God’s Universe and everything revolved around it and
mankind. The Church was so protective of this belief,
when Galileo attempted to promote Copernicus’ observation about the Earth
revolving around the Sun and not being the center of God’s Universe, the Church
subjected him to the Inquisition, forced him to recant, and imprisoned him for
nine years.
Only recently, in 1992, did the Vatican admit its error, found Galileo “not
guilty” of heresy,
though being very careful not to acknowledge that this may change humankind’s
status in God’s hierarchy.
How
is this notion of humans holding a uniquely God-given place in the hierarchy
reconciled with the scientific evidence of evolution of the species? In 1950, Pope Pius XII declared that
evolution and the Catholic faith do not conflict with one another, provided that
one believes in "ensoulment," the idea that God inserted a soul into
human beings at some point during evolution.